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The standard argument to the conclusion that artificial in-
telligence (AI) constitutes an existential risk for the human 
species uses two premises: (1) AI may reach superintelligent 
levels, at which point we humans lose control (the ‘singular-
ity claim’); (2) Any level of intelligence can go along with any 
goal (the ‘orthogonality thesis’). We find that the singularity 
claim requires a notion of ‘general intelligence’, while the or-
thogonality thesis requires a notion of ‘instrumental intelli-
gence’. If this interpretation is correct, they cannot be joined 
as premises and the argument for the existential risk of AI 
turns out invalid. If the interpretation is incorrect and both 
premises use the same notion of intelligence, then at least 
one of the premises is false and the orthogonality thesis re-
mains itself orthogonal to the argument to existential risk 
from AI. In either case, the standard argument for existential 
risk from AI is not sound.— Having said that, there remains 
a risk of instrumental AI to cause very significant damage if 
designed or used badly, though this is not due to superintel-
ligence or a singularity.
K E Y W O R D S
existential risk, general intelligence, instrumental intelligence, 
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1  | E XPOSITION: FROM SUPERINTELLIGENT AI TO E XISTENTIAL RISK
1.1 | The singularity claim
This remarkable statement from 56 years ago summarises the idea of the singularity and its risk:
Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activ-
ities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, 
an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably 
be an ‘intelligence explosion’, and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first 
ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is 
docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. (Good, 1965, p. 33)
In this vein, authors like Bostrom (2014) and Russell (2019a) claim that artificial intelligence (AI) is on a trajectory 
of development that will reach up to systems that have a roughly human level of intelligence. It has been claimed 
that this level has a 50% probability of occurrence by 2040– 50 (Müller & Bostrom, 2016). When this level is reached, 
these systems would have the ability to self- improve, or to develop further AI systems, and thus surpass the human 
level of intelligence, reaching ‘superintelligence’. The point in time where superintelligent AI is reached is often called 
‘the singularity’ (Kurzweil, 1999, 2005, p. 487). After the singularity, developments are largely out of human control 
because it is hard to control entities which are more intelligent than humans. We summarise these thoughts in a claim:
Singularity claim: Superintelligent AI is a realistic prospect, and it would be out of human control.
Given the lack of human control, developments after the singularity may well take a course that is negative for 
homo sapiens, even leading to the extinction of our species; this is called an ‘existential risk’. So, from the singularity 
claim some people conclude that AI poses an existential risk for humanity, while others, notably Kurzweil, have pos-
itive expectations for the future after the singularity. The discussion is summarised in (Chalmers, 2010) as well as 
(Armstrong, 2014; Eden et al., 2012; Müller, 2020; Shanahan, 2015; Yampolskiy, 2018). In our reconstruction of the 
argument to existential risk from AI, we identify two premises: The singularity claim, as just sketched, and the orthog-
onality thesis.
1.2 | Orthogonality— The thesis
It appears that the argument that superintelligent AI represents an existential risk also requires the premise that 
the superintelligent AI is not necessarily ethical or even super- ethical (Russell, 2019b, p. 51). If it were ethical, 
superintelligent AI would not constitute an existential risk— unless, of course, ending the existence of the human 
species is the most ethical course of action, in which case we should probably not call this a risk, however (we will 
return to this possibility below).
To support the conclusion of existential risk, the singularity claim is thus explicitly supplemented by a further 
premise:
The Orthogonality Thesis: Intelligence and final goals are orthogonal axes along which possible 
agents can freely vary. In other words, more or less any level of intelligence could in principle be 
combined with more or less any final goal. (Bostrom, 2012, p. 73; 2014, p. 107).
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To understand this terminology of orthogonality, we can imagine a Cartesian coordinate system, where the 
x- axis is the one dimension (say: intelligence) and the y- axis is the other (say: goals)— so the dimensions are ‘or-
thogonal’. Each agent has a tuple of two values, x and y, and any combination of values is possible. These goals 
are often formulated in terms of allocating ‘utility’ to outcomes, also called a ‘utility function’. As an illustration 
of orthogonality, one might think of various chess computers where the degree of intelligence is independent 
from the goal, which is the same for all systems. (While this is a useful metaphor, of course it is doubtful that 
goals or intelligence can be thought of as distributed in just one dimension.) We assume that the qualification 
‘more or less’ in the quotation is not meant to imply ethical limits, but rather paradoxes like goals that imply 
reducing intelligence.
Bostrom explains: ‘The orthogonality thesis implies that synthetic minds can have utterly non- anthropomorphic 
goals— goals as bizarre by our lights as sand- grain- counting or paperclip- maximizing.’ (Bostrom, 2012, p. 753). So, 
intelligent agents can have a wide variety of goals, and any goal is as good as any other.
1.3 | Existential risk— The conclusion
What is the situation if we cannot guarantee that the superintelligent AI is ‘docile’, as per Good's formulation? 
It may well be that the AI pursues goals that lead to human extinction, either by design or as a side- effect 
(Bostrom, 2002, 2013). As Bostrom summarises in his popular book:
Before the prospect of an intelligence explosion, we humans are like small children playing with 
a bomb. Such is the mismatch between the power of our plaything and the immaturity of our 
conduct. Superintelligence is a challenge for which we are not ready now. (Bostrom, 2014, p. 
259)
A terminological note: In these discussions, there is talk of ‘existential risk’ for humanity, and there is also 
talk of ‘catastrophic risk’, which is a larger set that includes risks for events that would produce a very large and 
lasting damage, but perhaps not involving the end of the human species (Bostrom & Ćirković, 2011; Häggström, 
2016; Ord, 2020; Rees, 2018). Catastrophic risks generally pose a particular challenge to our understanding be-
cause they combine very large damage with very low probability of occurring— while we are much more used to 
dealing with risks that have moderate damage and a moderate probability of occurring, such as a river flood (Ord 
et al., 2010). It follows from this observation that any discussion of the very high- impact risk of singularity has 
justification even if one thinks the probability of such singularity ever occurring is very small. Because superintel-
ligent AI may have more or less any goal and is out of human control, there is a risk that the goals it pursues will 
put it at odds with humans.
From these rough indications in the literature, we reconstruct the basic argument to existential risk from AI 
as follows:
Premise 1: Superintelligent AI is a realistic prospect, and it would be out of human control. 
(Singularity claim)
Premise 2: Any level of intelligence can go with any goals. (Orthogonality thesis)
Conclusion: Superintelligent AI poses an existential risk for humanity
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2  | IS THERE A TRICK? T WO KINDS OF INTELLIGENCE
The reconstruction shows that the argument for existential risk from AI has two premises, namely the singularity 
claim and the orthogonality thesis. We do not wish to challenge either of these premises; in fact, we think they 
are true (under the right interpretation). We are also not just complaining that central terms are undefined, or that 
they are value- laden (cf. Cave, 2020). Our concern is with the validity of the argument: It appears that for each of 
the two premises to be charitably interpreted as true, they must be interpreted as using the term ‘intelligence’ in 
different ways. If that is the case, they cannot be combined as premises into a valid argument for existential risk 
from AI. If, on the other hand, the premises use the same notion of intelligence then, we will argue, one of the 
premises turns out to be false, and thus the argument is not sound.
In discussions of the first premise, the singularity claim, superintelligence is typically explained on the basis of 
general human intelligence, where ‘super’ intelligence is just more of the same:
We can tentatively define a superintelligence as any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive per-
formance of humans in virtually all domains of interest … Note that the definition is noncommittal 
about how the superintelligence is implemented. It is also noncommittal regarding qualia; whether a 
superintelligence would have subjective conscious experience might matter greatly for some ques-
tions (in particular for some moral questions), but our primary focus here is on the causal anteced-
ents and consequences of superintelligence, not on the metaphysics of mind. (Bostrom, 2014, p. 22)
In the following, Bostrom discusses a few types of superintelligence: Speed Superintelligence, Collective 
Superintelligence, and Quality Superintelligence (Bostrom, 2014, pp. 52– 56). Furthermore, Bostrom adds an endnote: 
‘… we make no assumption regarding whether a superintelligent machine could have “true intentionality” (pace Searle, 
it could; but this seems irrelevant to the concerns of this book).’ (Bostrom, 2014, p. 265). So, the singularity claim 
assumes a notion of intelligence like the human one, just ‘more’ of it. For the time being, we can leave it to this vague 
characterisation we are given.
In the second premise, the orthogonality thesis, on the other hand, it appears that we are looking at instrumen-
tal intelligence, i.e., intelligence in the instrumental service of given goals:
For our purposes, ‘intelligence’ will be roughly taken to correspond to the capacity for instrumental 
reasoning […]. Intelligent search for instrumentally optimal plans and policies can be performed in 
the service of any goal. (Bostrom, 2012, p. 73)
This fits the notion of intelligence that Legg and Hutter synthesised out of over 70 different definitions of intelli-
gence: ‘Intelligence measures an agent's ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.’ (Legg & Hutter, 2007, 
p. 402). S. Russell says ‘Roughly speaking, an entity is intelligent to the extent that what it does is likely to achieve 
what it wants, given what it has perceived.’ (Russell, 2019a, p. 14). More precisely, instrumental intelligence stands in 
the tradition of classical decision theory, which assumes that a rational agent should always try to maximise expected 
utility— by evaluating the possible outcomes, allocating a (subjective) utility to these and estimating the probability of 
them occurring (e.g., Simon, 1955). The expected utility of each choice is equal to the sum of the utility of the possible out-
comes, multiplied by probability for each outcome. Rational choice that involves other agents is modelled in ‘game theory’ 
for decisions with and without uncertainty since the 1940s (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Note that this decision 
theory is normative, i.e., it says that rational humans should decide in this way, not that they actually do decide in this 
way— in fact we often do not, which means the theory has little use for predicting human behaviour.
This theory is traditionally assumed as a matter of course in AI:
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In short, a rational agent acts so as to maximise expected utility. It’s hard to overstate the impor-
tance of this conclusion. In many ways, artificial intelligence has been mainly about working out 
the details of how to build rational machines. (Russell, 2019a, p. 23, also 44 & 93; cf. Russell & 
Norvig, 2020, ch. 12 & 16).
Another example, closer to our discussion, is the programmatic paper ‘Superintelligence does not imply benevo-
lence’ by Fox and Shulman, where the general model for intelligent behaviour is the ‘AIXI formalism, which combines 
Solomonoff induction with Bayesian decision theory to optimize for unknown reward functions’ (2010, p. 1). In this 
kind of formalism, a reward function is set and then the system optimises for that function in a given environment. 
Higher intelligence is then a matter of optimisation power, achieving maximal reward function in a larger set of envi-
ronments. As Fox and Shulman rightly say, AIXI and similar systems have no room for a revision of reward functions. 
In short: ‘AI has adopted the standard model: we build optimising machines, we feed objectives into them, and off they 
go.’ (Russell, 2019a, p. 172). It is crucial for orthogonality that the ‘objectives’, ‘reward functions’ or ‘utility’ are given to 
the system, and remain stable, no matter how good, or intelligent, the system becomes at reaching those objectives.
Indeed, the revision of utility functions seems to play a very minor role, even in normative decision theory. 
Vassend remarks ‘it is … puzzling that even the very possibility of updating the utility function seems to have been 
completely neglected in the literature.’, and continues, ‘However, there is nothing in the formal theory that pre-
vents one from instead updating the utility function, while keeping the probability function fixed.’ (Vassend, 2021).
In the following we shall explain our observation that the current argument for the existential risk of superin-
telligent AI leverages two different notions of intelligence: In the singularity claim we imagine an agent ‘like us’, but 
more intelligent (general intelligence), while in the orthogonality thesis, we imagine an agent that has an ability to 
find ways to reach a given goal, but who would not reflect on that goal (instrumental intelligence).
The argument to existential risk from AI is thus to be understood as follows (with indices, g = general, 
i = instrumental):
Premise 1*: Superintelligentg AI is a realistic prospect and would be out of human control (Singularity 
claim)
Premise 2*: Any level of intelligencei can go with any goals (Orthogonality thesis)
Conclusion*: Superintelligentg,i AI poses an existential risk for humanity
We tried to find a charitable interpretation and think the premises are both true, as interpreted here. But the 
argument is now invalid since the premises use different notions of intelligence. The orthogonality thesis is itself 
orthogonal to the argument to existential risk. Note that this holds also if one takes the plausible line to interpret 
general intelligence as a superset of instrumental intelligence, because in this case the orthogonality thesis would only 
hold for a part of general intelligence, the instrumental part (but a superintelligent agent would have to have general 
intelligence for the singularity claim to hold). More on this in a moment.
Perhaps it helps to represent the tension we identify in a little table (Figure 1):
Orthogonality Existential risk
Instrumental intelligence Consistent Inconsistent?
F I G U R E  1   The tension
Orthogonality Existential Risk
Instrumental Intelligence Consistent Inconsistent?
General Intelligence Inconsistent? Consistent
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Orthogonality Existential risk
General intelligence Inconsistent? Consistent
The only way that this argument can be made to work is by making sure the same notion of intelligence is used 
in both premises. In the next section we explore the different combinations of the above to consider whether this 
can be done: Is there a notion of intelligence that we can use in both premises and with which we can interpret 
both premises as true?
3  | C AN WE HAVE IT BOTH WAYS?
3.1 | Orthogonality thesis & general intelligence?
In this section we discuss what happens if we combine orthogonality with general intelligence and thus interpret 
the orthogonality thesis thus:
Premise 2**: Any level of intelligenceg can go with any goals (Orthogonality thesis)
It appears that a general intelligence would be able to reflect on goals and possibly revise them in the light of 
rational thought. Humans, for example, can reflect on goals, and we can also reflect on our goals on ethical grounds 
and achieve ethical insight— so one would expect that an ‘intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of 
humans’ (Bostrom, 2014, p. 22) can do so, too. We often reflect on goals when a goal conflicts with others and we have 
to decide which goal is more important. Such reflection is often invoked in accounts of moral responsibility of human 
agents: It is standard to specify the conditions for human responsibility for an action in terms of two conditions, an 
epistemic condition, and a control condition. The epistemic condition specifies what the agent should have known at 
the time of action while the control condition demands that the agent, at the time of action, should be responsive to 
reasons for and against the action, including moral reasons (Fischer & Ravizza, 2000, pp. 28– 91); this is sometimes 
formulated as saying that the action had ‘The right kind of cause’ (Sartorio, 2016, p. 109). The orthogonality thesis is 
thus much stronger than the denial of a (presumed) Kantian thesis that more intelligent beings would automatically be 
more ethical, or that an omniscient agent would maximise expected utility on anything, including selecting the best 
goals: It denies any relation between intelligence and the ability to reflect on goals.
Human non- theistic ethics often starts from observations of descriptive facts, e.g., that humans avoid pain 
(Bentham), aim for the good (Aristotle), or expect other humans to follow universal rules (Kant) and moves from 
there to a superior goal or ethical rule. Whatever one may think about the rationality of these attempts to es-
tablish ethical obligations, if a human had been brought up to have ‘goals as bizarre … as sand- grain- counting or 
paperclip- maximizing’, they could reflect on them and revise them in the light of such reflection. Humans are capa-
ble of imagining moral progress for themselves and for societies; they even seem quite capable of contemplating 
deeply transformative changes to a different set of goals, even though this poses epistemic challenges (e.g., on the 
life of a vampire, see Paul, 2014). Indeed, many humans show a constant reflection on ethics.
So, what would prevent a generally superintelligent agent from reflecting on their goals, or from developing an 
ethics? One might argue that intelligent agents, human or AI, are actually unable to reflect on goals. Or that intelli-
gent agents are able to reflect on goals, but would not do so. Or that they would never revise goals upon reflection. 
Or that they would reflect on and revise goals but still not act on them. All of these suggestions run against the 
empirical fact that humans do sometimes reflect on goals, revise goals, and act accordingly. If one starts from a 
notion of general intelligence, orthogonality will need very substantial new arguments to become credible.
Since this road to a sound argument does not look promising, let us try the other option to use a single notion 
of intelligence in both premises: instrumental intelligence for both.
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3.2 | Singularity claim & instrumental intelligence?
In this step, we assume that we have an agent that has only instrumental ability to find efficient ways to achieve 
goals, and we consider whether such instrumental intelligence is sufficient to become the kind of superintelligence 
which poses an existential risk— so here we investigate the consistency of the singularity claim as per ‘Premise 1’, 
interpreting the intelligence in question to ‘instrumental intelligence’:
Premise 1**: Superintelligenti AI is a realistic prospect and would be out of human control (Singularity 
claim)
We shall grant that this kind of superintelligent instrumental agent is a possibility (as does Chalmers, 2010, fn. 20), 
despite the significant concern that a superintelligent instrumental ability would seem to require an understanding of 
the world that includes understanding agents, intentions, and ethical reflections on goals. This thought it sometimes 
called the ‘singularity paradox’, that AI could simultaneously be superintelligent and dumb: ‘Superintelligent machines 
are feared to be too dumb to possess common sense’ (Yampolskiy, 2012, p. 397).
To illustrate instrumental superintelligence one can imagine devising an algorithmic system that is given a goal, 
plus a formal description of the environment, and then finds a very good or even the best solution to reach the 
goal. Games like chess or Go are examples of this kind of problem, the kind which have occupied AI for a long time. 
Importantly, there are superintelligent AI systems now which do exactly this— superintelligent game- playing AI 
systems like AlphaGo or even AlphaZero. So why do they not pose an existential risk? Is it because they need more 
instrumental intelligence? Or is it because the instrumental intelligence is too domain- specific to solve problems 
‘in a wide range of environments’ as per Legg and Hutter (2007)? How does an instrumental intelligence even 
begin to consider ‘other environments’? What changes? An actual programme for chess will optimise play, but 
it knows nothing about the rest of the world, even about the constraints of its own workings or what the chess 
pieces look like, so how does it step out of that ‘environment’ or ‘frame’ of reference of the digital 8 × 8 chessboard 
and become an existential risk?
In his explanation of existential risk from superintelligence, Omohundro (2014) considers a computer which is 
given the goal ‘maximise chess performance’ and then thinks what to do next. After a lot of ‘self- improvement’, it 
realises that its initial goal can best be achieved if some other, very different goals are also achieved, e.g., maximal 
computing power, access to electricity supply, survival of the ‘self’. (The notion of a ‘self’ for an AI is especially 
problematic, but we leave this aside, for now.) It might also think about how to weaken the play of its opponents, 
investigate their psychologies and intentions, and come to the conclusion that re- directing all energy supplies to 
itself or simply killing all humans is the safest way to achieve its goal. This type of risk is well known to program-
mers and its popular slogan is ‘be careful what you wish for’; Stuart Russell aptly calls it the ‘King Midas Problem’ 
(Russell, 2019a, p. 136). Note that the imagined chess computer becomes an existential risk because of its ability 
to re- consider instrumental action by stepping out of the frame of chess moves and considering the wider picture.
This ability to move between narrower and wider frames is an important feature of general intelligence. In 
Gödel, Escher, Bach, Hofstadter remarks: ‘It is an inherent property of intelligence that it can jump out of the 
task which it is performing, and survey what it has done; it is always looking for, and often finding, patterns.’ 
(Hofstadter, 1979, p. 37). Our use of ‘frame’ is in reference to the classic ‘Frame Problem’ in AI, the most general 
sense of which is: How do we specify what is relevant for consideration in a given context, environment, or ‘frame’ 
(Shanahan, 2016)? In playing chess, a human would be able to step in and out of the frames and consider wider 
goals. When playing a young child, for example, an adult might consider that the point of playing is not to crush the 
opponent, but perhaps to have an enjoyable experience for both parties, and thus the adult may let the child win. 
A human could also consider when it is better to do something other than making a move on the chess board right 
now; in fact, a human could feel ethically obliged to stop playing chess in order to attend a more important matter.
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Consider an anthropomorphic illustration of instrumental and general intelligence: a foot soldier and the gen-
eral of an army. Each of them is good at their task, but the tasks are different: The task of the foot soldier is to find 
good instrumental ways to follow orders and achieve the goal he is given. This does involve various considerations, 
including survival, but all these are subservient to the order and goal. Moreover, the ‘frame’ of the problem for 
the foot soldier— what essentially the problem is for the soldier— does not change beyond some directive along 
the lines of ‘fight and stay alive’. By contrast, the general must be sensitive to how the changing situation on the 
battlefield, at various scales, changes what is significant and relevant— what the problem is changes. The general 
must therefore continuously and competently redefine the ‘frame’ in order to understand just what the problem 
is first, in order to recognise what actions are instrumental, in the new context, to achieving the goal, winning 
the battle and the war. From her higher vantage point, she must solve problems in each sub- frame of the battle 
instrumentally, but also move up a level and discern and define and decide which goals matter now. At some point, 
the general may even realise that it is better to withdraw and lose a particular battle in order to win the war. An 
account of intelligence which says that both the foot soldier and the general are just ‘problem solving’ fails to make 
the differentiation of optimising for one frame versus redefining and navigating through many.
So, to argue that instrumental intelligence is sufficient for existential risk, we have to explain how an instru-
mental intelligence can navigate different frames. S. Russell says an AI would realise that ‘it can't fetch the coffee 
if it's dead’ and continues ‘There is no need to build self- preservation in because it is an instrumental goal …’ 
(Russell, 2019a, p. 141). This view that a superintelligent AI would have such goals is sometimes called the ‘instru-
mental convergence thesis’ (Bostrom, 2012; Drexler, 2019, p. 100; Häggström, 2019, p. 155f; Omohundro, 2014). 
If an AI could ‘realise' this, then ‘instrumental’ is used here in a way that allows widening the frame, so that seems 
to allow for an ability to reflect on goals, what we took to be a defining feature of general intelligence above.
That seems to be what happens every time such ‘instrumental’ intelligence is used to explain and argue for ex-
istential risk: It is widened so much that it seems to become general, which brings us back to the other horn of the 
dilemma: Why should such a wider intelligence be unable to reflect on goals? Why should orthogonality hold for 
this wider intelligence? Simply put, if the AI is capable of realising what is relevant, why would the realisations of 
the AI stop before it realises the relevance of reflecting on goals? The line seems to be arbitrary. We illustrate this 
in the following section in terms of the line between thoughts which are and are not ‘accessible’ to an AI system.
3.3 | Illustration
Let us imagine a system that is a massively improved version of AlphaGo (Silver et al., 2018), say ‘AlphaGo+++’, 
with instrumental superintelligence, i.e., maximising expected utility. In the proposed picture of singularity claim & 
orthogonality thesis, some thoughts are supposed to be accessible to the system, but others are not. For example:
Accessible
1. I can win if I pay the human a bribe, so I will rob a bank and pay her.
2. I cannot win at Go if I am turned off.
3. The more I dominate the world, the better my chances to achieve my goals.
4. I should kill all humans because that would improve my chances of winning.
Not accessible
 5. Winning in Go by superior play is more honourable than winning by bribery.
 6. I am responsible for my actions.
 7. World domination would involve suppression of others, which may imply suffering and violation of rights.
 8. Killing all humans has negative utility, everything else being equal.
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 9. Keeping a promise is better than not keeping it, everything else being equal.
 10. Stabbing the human hurts them, and should thus be avoided, everything else being equal.
 11. Some things are more important than me winning at Go.
 12. Consistent goals are better than inconsistent ones
 13. Some goals are better than others
 14. Maximal overall utility is better than minimal overall utility.
It looks doubtful that we can have it both ways: It appears that there is no notion of intelligence that is orthog-
onal to goals, but also general enough to constitute existential risk. It also appears now that we may be looking at 
a continuum of intelligence notions, from strictly instrumental, to notions that allow some widening of frames, to 
unlimited consideration of goals. There may be technical solutions that allow for such a ‘middle way’ in the design 
of AI for ‘final goals’, rather than ‘instrumental goals’; this is a trajectory that we cannot go into at this point, see 
(Häggström, 2019; Häggström & Rhodes, 2019; Miller et al., 2020).
4  | REPAIRS BY ADDING A SSUMPTIONS
4.1 | Relativism to the rescue?
One reason why a generally superintelligent AI may be unable to reflect on goals, may be that reflection on goals is 
impossible. One's utility function may say ‘maximise paperclips’ or ‘minimise paperclips’; ‘maximise pain’ or ‘mini-
mise pain’; ‘try to keep your promises’ or ‘try to break your promises’; but any goal is as good as any other. This 
would be a way to save the orthogonality thesis while interpreting intelligence as ‘general’ here, i.e., in a way that 
is consistent with the singularity claim.
The idea that reflection on goals may be impossible is a natural thought in an instrumental view of intelligence, 
since on that view any evaluation is relative to a utility function and a choice between different utility functions 
would require using a superior goal that makes one utility function ‘better’ than the other. On this proposal, any 
reflection on goals, including ethics, lies outside the realm of intelligence. Some people may think that they are 
reflecting on goals, but they are wrong. That is why orthogonality holds for any intelligence. Supporters of exis-
tential risk from AI could qualify their argument like this: ‘When I say there is existential risk, I mean this is a ‘risk’ 
in my ethics. In your ethics, this may be a positive outcome. And there is no way that we can even discuss which 
position is better than the other.’ In this version of relativism, we cannot know if a utility function is better than 
any other; we cannot step out of that frame. If this is indeed the choice made in the argument for existential risk 
from AI, we would expect that the assumption is made explicit and that it is justified to some extent— but neither 
of these has happened.
Incidentally, we happen to think that the proposition ‘the extinction of humanity is ethically the best solution’ 
has some arguments speaking in its favour, e.g., in an evolutionary framework, that might make a superintelligent 
being come to this conclusion (which might not involve harming any humans). It is incompatible with the orthog-
onality thesis to say that a superintelligent being would have a higher probability of reaching this insight than any 
other intelligent beings, and the proposition would undermine the spirit of talking about existential ‘risk’. To be 
sure, there is a possible position that says ‘the extinction of humanity is ethically the best solution’ but adds ‘I am 
sad to realise, as a human myself’, but this is not the position taken by those who warn of existential risk from AI. 
It is also not a position we wish to advocate.
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4.2 | Moral insight without moral motivation?
Perhaps there is a different additional assumption that could plausibly be added. In ethics, there is a standard 
problem that an agent might have the moral insight that x is the right action, but lack the moral motivation to actu-
ally attempt to do x— this is traditionally called ‘weakness of the will’. At the same time, several traditions in ethics 
have underlined that if I really know that it is right to do x, then this provides motivation to do x. For example, Kant 
(1786) holds that higher levels of rationality or intelligence will go along with a better insight of what is moral, and 
better motivation to act morally, while Hume denies this (cf. Chalmers, 2010, p. 28, 36f). Bostrom claims that the 
orthogonality thesis does not depend on adopting Hume's position:
David Hume, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, thought that beliefs alone (say, about what is 
a good thing to do) cannot motivate action: some desire is required. This would support the orthog-
onality thesis by undercutting one possible objection to it, namely that sufficient intelligence might 
entail the acquisition of certain beliefs which would then necessarily produce certain motivations. 
However, although the orthogonality thesis can draw support from the Humean theory of moti-
vation, it does not presuppose it. In particular, one need not maintain that beliefs alone can never 
motivate action. (Bostrom, 2014, p. 279, fn. 273)
For Humean or other reasons, it may be then that an AI system has the insight that its goals are not the goals it 
should pursue, but it still lacks motivation to act otherwise. In fact, it may lack motivation altogether. This additional 
premise is a possibility but we think it comes with significant questions: (a) Is moral insight without moral motivation 
possible?, (b) Is superintelligent AI without motivation possible?, and (c) Would superintelligent AI without motivation 
constitute an existential risk? Adding this premise that superintelligent AI does not have moral motivation would thus 
require significant motivation, and it would also mean one does not need the contested assumption of orthogonality 
anymore. In this respect, the repair through moral motivation is different from the repair through relativity: if one 
introduces relativity, orthogonality is retained; if one introduces lack of motivation, orthogonality is discarded.
5  | CONCLUSION: THERE IS ,  A S YET,  NO SOUND ARGUMENT TO 
E XISTENTIAL RISK FROM AI
In effect, we failed to reconstruct the argument to existential risk from AI in such a way that (a) the two premises 
remain true and (b) the argument remains valid— having true premises seems to require two notions of intelligence, 
while validity requires one notion. Is there a notion of intelligence that is ‘general enough’ to assure existential 
risk from superintelligence, but ‘instrumental enough’ to exclude ethical reflection on goals by superintelligent 
systems? We do not think so. But if there is no such notion of intelligence with which we can ‘have it both ways’, 
then there is no sound argument for the existential risk from superintelligent AI.
Assuming that the orthogonality thesis does hold for instrumental intelligence, the main issue we actually face 
is highly capable instrumental AI that can cause significant damage, if designed or used badly— perhaps this is a 
catastrophic risk, though this is not general superintelligence, and it is not the result of a singularity. If this is our 
threat, then the ‘control problem’ for AI takes a very different shape.
One last note of caution: As we said above, we could well be wrong somewhere and the classical argument for 
existential risk from AI is actually sound, or there is another argument that we have not considered. Given the very 
large utility loss at stake, existential risk from AI is worth investigating. We hope that our paper can help provoke 
some serious philosophical discussion about the fundamental notions at play here.
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